

TIINA CARITA ROSENQVIST

CURRICULUM VITAE

CONTACT

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RESEARCH

AOS: Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science, Philosophy of Perception, Philosophy of Mind, Color, Pain
AOC: Epistemology, Indo-Tibetan Buddhist Philosophy, Cross-Cultural Philosophy, Philosophy of Science

APPOINTMENTS

Postdoctoral Fellow, Society of Fellows, Dartmouth College. 7/2023—
Graduate Teaching Fellow (Part-time), University of Pennsylvania. F 2022

DEGREES

PhD in Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania, USA. 2023
Dissertation title: *Color, Competence, and Correctness*
Committee: Gary Hatfield (*Chair*) | Quayshawn Spencer | Lisa Miracchi Titus | Elizabeth Johnson
MA in Philosophy, University of Tampere, Finland. 2011
Thesis advisor: Leila Haaparanta | Overall grade: *Excellent*
BSc in Philosophy, University of Tampere, Finland 2008
Thesis advisor: Sami Pihlström | Overall grade: *Excellent*

CERTIFICATES AND OTHER EDUCATION

— *Graduate Certificate in Social, Cognitive, and Affective Neuroscience*, 2020
Center for Neuroscience and Society (CNS), University of Pennsylvania.
— *Certificate in College and University Teaching*, 2020
Center for Teaching and Learning (CTL), University of Pennsylvania.
— Tibetan Language & Buddhist Philosophy (full-time), 2014–2017
Library of Tibetan Works and Archives (LTWA) Center for Tibetan Studies, India.
— Asian Studies (six graduate courses, part-time), 2012–2016
Finnish University Network for Asian Studies, Finland.

PUBLICATIONS (✧ Peer-reviewed)

[2] "Seeing *with* Color: Psychophysics and the Function of Color Vision." *Synthese*, forthcoming. ✧

- [1] "Color and Competence: A New View of Color Perception" in José Manuel Viejo & Mariano Sanjuán (Eds.), *Life and Mind - New Directions in the Philosophy of Biology and Cognitive Sciences*, Cham: Springer. 2023. ✧

WORKS IN PROGRESS

"The Pain System is Not a Bodily Disturbance Detector" (*under review*)

"Perceptual Competences and the Primary/Secondary Quality Distinction"

"How is Pain like Color?"

FELLOWSHIPS, GRANTS, AND AWARDS

Fellowships and Major Awards

- The American-Scandinavian Foundation (ASF) Fellowship. \$20,000 (awarded, declined). 2023
- Kone Foundation Research Grant, Finland. €30,000 (selective, 5-6% success rate). 2022–2023
- Benjamin Franklin Fellowship, University of Pennsylvania. 5 years of full PhD funding. 2017–2022

Small Grants and Awards (Selected)

- SAS Dean's Travel Subvention, Penn. \$500. SP 2023
- Philosophy Department Travel Grant, Penn. \$2,191. F 2022
- SASGov Small Grant, Penn. \$400. F 2022
- GAPSA Research Student Travel Grant, Penn. \$800. F 2022
- GAPSA Research Student Travel Grant, Penn. \$800. SU 2022
- Philosophy Department Travel Grant, Penn. \$300. SP 2022
- SAS Dean's Travel Subvention, Penn. \$500. SP 2022

Event Support Grants (Selected)

- MindCORE Activity Fund Award (with Sara Purinton). \$1,200. SP 2023
- GAPSA Conference Grant (with MAP-Penn). \$1,500. SP 2023
- Perry World House International Visitors Program Award (with MAP-Penn). \$850. SP 2023
- Wolf Humanities Center Conference Grant (with MAP-Penn). \$500. SP 2023
- SASGov Conference Grant (with MAP-Penn). \$1,400. SP 2023
- SASGov Conference Grant (with MAP-Penn). \$1,500. SP 2022
- The Greater Philadelphia Philosophy Consortium Grant (with MAP-Penn). \$2,000. SP 2022
- Wolf Humanities Center Conference Grant (with MAP-Penn). \$500. SP 2022
- SASGov Conference Grant (with MAP-Penn). \$1,500. F 2021
- Marc Sanders Foundation Grant (with MAP-Penn). \$300. F 2021

PRESENTATIONS (✧ Refereed | ✨ Invited)

TALKS

"Perceptual Competences and the Primary/Secondary Quality Distinction"

- Society for Philosophy and Psychology (SPP) Annual Conference, Pittsburgh, USA. ✧ 6/2023

"Pain is not a Bodily Disturbance Detector"

- Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology (SSPP) Annual Conference, Louisville, KY, USA, with comments from Gabriel Siegel. ✧ 3/2023
- Philosophy of Biology and Cognitive Sciences XI, University of Salamanca-ECyT, Spain. ✧ 11/2022

"Seeing with Color: Insights from Psychophysics"

- The 3rd Context, Cognition, and Communication Conference: Varieties of Meaning and Content, University of Warsaw, Poland. ✧ 9/2022
- The 3rd Joint Conference of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology (SPP) and the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology (ESPP), University of Milan, Italy. ✧ 7/2022
- Language, Culture and Mind 9: Sensory Experience and Communication, University of Almería, Spain. ✧ 7/2022

"Color and Competence: A New View of Color Perception"

- Primary and Secondary Qualities Reading / Research Group, University of California, Irvine, USA (delivered virtually). 7/2021
- MIRA (Mind-like Intelligence, Research, and Analysis) Group, University of Pennsylvania. 1/2021

"What (on Earth) Are Color Visual Systems Doing?"

- Virtual Vision Futures, York University, Canada (delivered virtually). ✧ 6/2021

"Color Illusions and the 'Competence-Embeddedness' of Color Vision."

- Philosophy of Biology and Cognitive Sciences X, Autonomous University of Madrid, Spain (delivered virtually). ✧ 5/2021
- Philosophy in the Wild Workshop, University of Pennsylvania. 8/2020
- 15th Annual West Chester Philosophy Graduate Conference: Philosophy of Mind, West Chester University, USA (cancelled due to COVID-19). ✧ 4/2020

"Seeing with Color: Lessons from Visual Ecology, Psychophysics and Neuroscience"

- Philosophy Graduate Student Colloquium Series, University of Pennsylvania. 12/2020

"Philosophy of Color: Lessons from Neuroscience?"

- 6th Annual Social, Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience (SCAN) Retreat, University of Pennsylvania. ❖ 2/2020

"Metametaphysics of Color"

- MIRA (Mind-like Intelligence, Research, and Analysis) Group, University of Pennsylvania. 11/2019

"The Epistemic Exclusion of Non-Western Philosophy"

- MIRA (Mind-like Intelligence, Research, and Analysis) Group, University of Pennsylvania. 4/2019

"The Real Challenge from Embodied Cognition"

- MIRA (Mind-like Intelligence, Research, and Analysis) Group, University of Pennsylvania. 9/2018

"Cognitive Neuroethology and the Contents of Perceptual Representations"

- MIRA (Mind-like Intelligence, Research, and Analysis) Group, University of Pennsylvania. 2/2018

COMMENTS

Christopher Masciari's "Contingent Perceptual Experience"

- Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology (SSPP) Annual Conference. Mobile, USA. ❖ 4/2022

TEACHING (University of Pennsylvania)

Instructor of Record

- Philosophy and Visual Perception (PHIL 2843/VLST 2230). F 2022
- Philosophy and Visual Perception (PHIL 223/VLST 223). F 2021

Teaching Assistant

- Visual Studies: Mind, Eye, and Image (VLST 101; two sections; 4-week fill-in). SP 2022
- Philosophy of Science (PHIL 425, grader). SP 2021
- Philosophy of Mind and Language: What is Meaning? (PHIL 205; two sections). SP 2020
- Epistemology (PHIL 231; two sections). F 2019
- Visual Studies: Mind, Eye, and Image (VLST 101; two sections). SP 2019
- Logic & Formal Reasoning (PHIL 015; two sections). F 2018

Guest Lecturer

- “Millikan and the Myth of the Essential Indexical,” *Philosophy of Mind and Language: What is Meaning?* (Instructor: Lisa Miracchi Titus). SP 2020
- “Chirimuuta on Color,” *Philosophy of Mind and Language: What is Meaning?* (Instructor: Lisa Miracchi Titus). SP 2020

Other

- TA Trainer, Center for Teaching and Learning (CTL). SU 2021
- Workshop Facilitator, Center for Teaching and Learning (CTL). SU 2022
- Philosophy Tutor, Philosophy Department. SP 2021

SERVICE

- Chapter Representative, Minorities and Philosophy at University of Pennsylvania (MAP-Penn). 2019–2023
- President, Minorities and Philosophy at University of Pennsylvania (MAP-Penn). 2022–2023
- Co-organizer, *MAP-Penn Conference on Climate Justice*. 4/2023
- Co-organizer (with Sara Purinton), *MAP-Penn Visiting Speaker Series: Dr. Polaris Koi*. 4/2023
- Graduate Representative to the Philosophy Department, Penn. 2021–2020
- Graduate Wellness Representative to the Philosophy Department, Penn. 2020–2022
- Co-organizer (with Sara Purinton), *Penn Philosophy Teaching Workshop on Disability Inclusion and Accessibility*. 8/2022
- Co-organizer, *MAP-Penn Summer Colloquium on Philosophy of Disability and Illness*. 8/2022
- Co-organizer, *MAP-Penn Conference on Philosophy of Disability and Illness*. 4/2022
- Organizational Consultant and Website Creator, *6th Latinx Philosophy Conference*, Temple University. 3/2022
- Organizer, *Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Philosophy of Science Research Group*, Penn. F 2021
- Co-organizer (with Sara Purinton), *Philosophy of Pain Reading Group*, Penn. SP 2021
- Mentor, *Step-Ahead Mentorship Program (STAMP)*, MindCORE, Penn. 2020–2021
- Co-organizer, *MAP-Penn Conference on Philosophy of Race*. 11/2020
- Co-organizer (with Deven M. Patel and Ben Baker), *Indian Philosophy Reading Group*, Penn. SP 2019
- Co-organizer (with Yosef Washington), *Philosophy & Film Series*, Penn. 2017–2019
- Office Hour Coordinator, Philosophy Department, Penn. 2018–2019

AFFILIATIONS AND MEMBERSHIPS

— Member, <i>Society for Philosophy and Psychology</i> (SPP).	2023–present
— Member, <i>American Philosophical Association</i> (APA).	2020–present
— Member, <i>European Society for Philosophy and Psychology</i> (ESPP).	2022–present
— Member, <i>Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology</i> (SSPP).	2022–present
— Member, <i>Philosophy of Science Association</i> (PSA).	2023–present
— Member, <i>International Society for the Philosophy of the Sciences of the Mind</i> (ISPSM)	2023–present
— Graduate Student Associate, MindCORE, Penn.	2019–2023
— Member, Minorities and Philosophy at University of Pennsylvania (MAP-Penn).	2017–2023
— Member, <i>Philosophy of Psychology Reading Group</i> , Penn.	2021–2022
— Member, <i>MIRA (Mind-like Intelligence, Research, and Analysis) Group</i> , Penn.	2017–2021
— Member, <i>History and Philosophy of Science Group, Consortium for History of Science, Technology, and Medicine.</i>	2021
— Member, <i>Primary and Secondary Qualities Reading Group</i> , University of California, Irvine.	SP/SU 2021

GRADUATE COURSEWORK

Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania (= audited), GPA 4.0 / 4.0*

— Philosophy of Race (Quayshawn Spencer).*	SP 2022
— Philosophy of Science (Quayshawn Spencer).*	SP 2021
— Philosophy of Psychology (Gary Hatfield).*	F 2020
— Philosophy of Psychology: Phenomenal Consciousness (Gary Hatfield).	SP 2020
— Philosophy of Mind: the Mental and the Normative (Lisa Miracchi Titus).	F 2019
— Philosophy of Psychology (Gary Hatfield)*	F 2019
— Topics in Epistemology: Normativity in Epistemology (Daniel Singer).	SP 2019
— Philosophy of Psychology: Appearances from Descartes to Chisholm (Gary Hatfield).	SP 2019
— Aristotle's Ethics (Susan Sauvé Meyer).	F 2018
— Philosophy and Visual Perception (Gary Hatfield)	F 2018
— Philosophy of Mind: Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence (Lisa Miracchi Titus).	SP 2018
— Political Authority and Political Obligation (Stephen Perry).	SP 2018
— Philosophy of Language (Lisa Miracchi Titus).	SP 2018
— Formal Logic I (Scott Weinstein).	SP 2018
— Philosophy of Psychology: Mind in Nature (Gary Hatfield).	F 2017
— Kant's Philosophy of Religion (Andrew Chignell).	F 2017
— Proseminar (Quayshawn Spencer).	F 2017

Neuroscience, University of Pennsylvania, GPA 4.0 / 4.0

— Contemporary Research Issues in Social, Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience (Martha Farah).	SP 2020
— Neuroscience, Brain Development and Learning (Hilary Gerstein, PHIL 999 on transcript).	F 2019
— Foundations of Social, Cognitive, and Affective Neuroscience (Martha Farah).	F 2018

For graduate courses completed at the University of Tampere and the Finnish University Network for Asian Studies, please ask to see transcripts.

PEDAGOGICAL TRAINING

Workshops, University of Pennsylvania

— Inclusive & Equitable Teaching Mini Course (5 sessions) (Sebastian Dilones).	SP 2023
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— Designing for Disability: Pedagogical Practices That Support Disabled Folks (and Everyone Else) (Cait Kirby).	8/2022
— Inclusive Teaching Strategies: Supporting Students with Disabilities (Aaron Spector).	8/2022
— Mentor Training Workshop (Jamiella Brooks & Emily Elliot).	10/2020
— Effective Lecturing (Daniel Singer).	4/2019
— Wellness Advising in Difficult Spaces (Lisa Miracchi Titus).	3/2019
— Using Office Hours Effectively (Errol Lord).	11/2018
— Designing and Teaching an Online Course (Susan Sauv� Meyer).	11/2018
— Teaching Philosophy to Pre-College Students (Karen Detlefsen).	10/2018
— Giving Effective Feedback (Sherelle Ferguson).	10/2018
— Teaching Outside Your Area of Expertise (Ava Creemers).	10/2018
— Teaching to Non-Majors (Phoebe Askelson).	10/2018
— Establishing Relationships with Students (Elizabeth Bynum).	10/2018
— Making Group Works Work (Dana Cypress).	9/2018
— TA Training.	8/2018

NON-ACADEMIC PUBLICATIONS

བོད་ཀྱི་ཆུང་མཁའ་ལྟོན་གྱི་སྒྲུབ་པ་ལྟོན་པ་ <i>Tibetan Folktales</i> (with Nyima Dekyi). Dharamsala, India: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives (LTWA).	2019
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LANGUAGES

Finnish | Native
English | Native-like
French | Intermediate
Swedish | Intermediate
Tibetan | Intermediate

REFERENCES

Gary Hatfield, Adam Seybert Professor
Department of Philosophy
University of Pennsylvania
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Quayshawn Spencer, Robert S. Blank
Presidential Associate Professor
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Lisa Miracchi Titus, Assistant Professor
Department of Philosophy
University of Denver
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Elizabeth (Zab) Johnson, Executive
Director & Senior Fellow
Wharton Neuroscience Initiative
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia PA 19104-6302
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Daniel Singer, Associate Professor
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(Teaching Reference)

DISSERTATION SUMMARY

The mainstream view in contemporary analytic philosophy is that perception is primarily in the business of representing the mind-independent world as it is. My dissertation explores an alternative conception: that the goal of perception is to guide successful action and that perceptions do not need to track mind-independent properties to play this action-guiding role. I focus on two types of perception: color perception and pain perception. I start with the former and advocate a pragmatist, empirically-guided approach which begins by inquiring into the function of color vision. After arguing that none of the extant philosophical views of color are satisfactory, I answer the function question by focusing on systematic color perceptual phenomena investigated by psychophysicists. I argue that the human color visual system is an enhancement system: that is, its job is to help us better discriminate, track, and recognize meaningful objects, properties, and relations. I then build on this idea using the notion of ‘competence-embeddedness.’ I propose that color vision is embedded in a network of competences: the aim of color vision is to help organisms manifest these competences, and color experiences are correct when they result from competence-enhancing processing. The framework is explanatorily robust. For example, it allows me to conceptualize many textbook color illusions as special cases of successful color perception where the demands of the relevant competences clash. Finally, I use the notion of ‘competence-embeddedness’ to develop a new account of pain. I argue that the pain system is not a bodily disturbance detector, but a sophisticated, context-responsive security system whose primary goal is to help organisms manifest important behavioral and cognitive competences.

DISSERTATION ABSTRACT (EXTENDED)

The dissertation consists of five separate but interconnected chapters. The first chapter pertains to philosophical methodology. How should we first approach the problems of color? I compare two empirically-informed approaches: the intuition-led, empirically-refined approach and the empirically-guided approach. I argue that the first approach isn’t viable: intuitions aren’t reliable guides to truths about color because they conflict in both intrapersonal and interpersonal contexts. I advocate the empirically-guided approach: I propose that we start with the question of the function of color vision and answer that question in light of the phenomena studied by vision scientists. What is the best explanation for those phenomena? Which conception of the function of color vision best accommodates the data? Once this question has been answered, we can work our way up to an epistemology of color perception and to a metaphysics of color in a genuinely empirically-grounded way.

In the second chapter, I provide a critical overview of the main positions in contemporary philosophy of color. I first discuss how philosophers have attempted to carve up the logical space of philosophy of color and I then propose an alternative typology which proceeds from epistemological and semantic considerations. I use this typology to draw attention to important commonalities masked by other typologies and to highlight some major problems that the views in each category face. I discuss theories in five broad groups: traditional views, radical error theories, hybrid views, radically relativist views, and radically pragmatist views. I argue that radical error theories operate within a severely restricted account of what real colors could be like, traditional views entail widespread color misperception, hybrid views cannot resolve the tension between usefulness and correspondence as standards of correctness, radically relativist views struggle to accommodate our intuitions about color misperception, and existing radically pragmatist views fail to provide a much-needed analysis of ‘usefulness.’

In the third chapter, I inquire into the function of color vision. I focus on perceptual phenomena studied in psychophysics and argue that the best explanation for these phenomena is that the color

visual system is a perceptual enhancement system. I first introduce two rival conceptions of the function of color vision: that color vision aims to detect/track and represent the fine-grained colors of distal objects and scenes (*Seeing Color*) and that it aims to help organisms discriminate, detect, track and/or recognize ecologically important objects, properties, and relations more directly (*Seeing with Color*). I then discuss two kinds of systematic perceptual phenomena investigated by psychophysicists: approximate color constancy and color induction. I argue from the premise that *Seeing with Color* better accommodates and explains these phenomena to the conclusion that it is the conception that an empirically-guided philosopher of color ought to adopt.

The fourth chapter builds on the *Seeing with Color* conception of the function of color vision. Here I have two main goals. The first is to sketch a new view of color perception, one that analyzes the notion of ‘usefulness’ in terms of ‘competence-embeddedness.’ The core of the view can be expressed in the following two theses: (i) the overarching *function* of color vision is to enable and enhance the manifestation of relevant (species-specific) competences and (ii) color experiences are *correct* when they result from processing that directly and non-accidentally subserves the manifestation of such competences. The second goal is to show that the view can accommodate and account for a wide variety of color perceptual phenomena, including many problem cases. Importantly, the framework allows us to differentiate between two kinds of good cases of color perception: *ideal* cases where the demands of the relevant competences converge and *non-ideal* cases where the demands of the relevant competences diverge and clash.

In the fifth chapter, I apply the empirically-guided approach and the framework of competences and competence-embeddedness to pain. A popular view in contemporary philosophy is that the pain system is a bodily disturbance detector: that the function of pain states is to track/detect and represent physical, mind-independent bodily disturbances and their mind-independent properties, and that the phenomenal character of (the sensory dimension of) pain experience supervenes on this representational content. The view can accommodate paradigmatic pain cases, *e.g.*, when pain follows from touching a hot stove. Once we consider more complex pain phenomena, however, it has seemingly little to offer. I discuss disassociation of bodily disturbances and pain experiences, interpersonal and intrapersonal variation in pain thresholds, the effects of repeated stimulation on experienced pain intensity, and the modulation of pain experience by contextual factors. I argue that these phenomena suggest that the pain system is a sophisticated security system, not a bodily disturbance detector.