Color, pain, and the agent-centered model of perception

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(Work in progress, under review)

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Abstract: Pain and color perception are difficult to accommodate within the standard model of perception which claims that perception is strictly in the business of informing us about the mind-independent states of the extra-mental world. By contrast, both can be easily accommodated within an alternative, agent-centered model of perception which holds that the overarching function of perception is to guide successful action and that perceptions need not align with mind-independent reality to play this role. I propose that the explanatory flexibility of the agent-centered model makes it the preferable model of perception. I first give an overview of the standard model and its treatment of color perception and pain, and then highlight two problems the model faces: metamerism and intrapersonal variation in color perception. I use these problems to motivate the agent-centered model, and show how the model can also straightforwardly accommodate the complexities of pain. After addressing three worries about the agent-centered model, I conclude that we have good reasons for adopting it as a general framework for philosophical work on perception.